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INFORME
ON THE BRINK OF A FEDERAL STATE? - THE DECENTRALISATION MODEL 
OF THE PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION1
por Maria Bertel
Profesora de Derecho Público, Universidad de Innsbruck
ABSTRACT
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
vian Constitution’s chapter on decentralisation. A distribution of competencies was 
introduced and various organic laws were enacted in this domain. More than a dec-
ade later, the decentralisation process is still work in progress. In this article, I will 
analyse the relevant case law of the Constitutional Court and the most important 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
most crucial problem areas of the decentralisation process. I will examine the question 
of whether Peru is a unitary or a federal state by means of comparative standards of 
federalism and through references to other decentralised systems.
RESUMEN
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
la Constitución peruana sobre descentralización. Se introdujo una distribución de 
competencias y se promulgaron varias leyes orgánicas en este ámbito. Más de una 
década después, el proceso de descentralización sigue en marcha. En este artículo 
analizaré la jurisprudencia pertinente del Tribunal Constitucional y las disposiciones 
constitucionales y orgánicas más importantes en el ámbito de la descentralización 
para destacar las áreas problemáticas más importantes del proceso de descentrali-
zación. Examinaré la cuestión de si el Perú es un estado unitario o un estado federal 
por medio de normas comparativas de federalismo y a través de referencias a otros 
sistemas descentralizados.
1. First published in Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 6, issue 1, 2014 (minor revisions made on 5th of November, 
2018)
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since obtaining independence, South American states have found themselves in a cons-
tant process of decentralisation and (re)centralisation2 ;Venezuela, Brazil & Argentina 
are federal states, others such as Ecuador & Chile are decentralised but still unitary 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
Historically, Peru has had a predominately centralised system with occasional short 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
During the last decade, after President Fujimori left power, problems which mainly 
arose out of inequalities3 between the rural parts of the country and the metropoli-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Peru once again became a decentralised state as Regional councils were elected and 
competencies transferred to the regional and local level (Goedeking 2001: 198; De-
gregori 2003: 220).
The paper focuses on the constitutional and legal position of the regions, to answer 
the question of whether Peru is still a (purely) unitary state or if it can already be seen 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional provisions in the context of decentralisation. Second, I will analyse the 
relevant law on decentralisation and the case law of the Constitutional Court with 
regard to comparative standards of federalism. 
II. DECENTRALISATION AND CONSTITUTION
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
titutional terms depends on the analysis of both constitutional provisions and certain 
organic laws on decentralisation. The criteria guiding this analysis draws from compa-
rative studies on federal systems (Watts 2008; Kincaid 2005). Comparative standards 
of federalism include the distribution of competencies which vests the constituent 
states with legislative and constitution-making powers, a second chamber or other 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
federal states, however, is gradually coming to depend on the quantity of the criteria 
met and the quality of their implementation. The more criteria are met, the more likely 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The Peruvian decentralisation process is primarily laid down in Art. 1884, but Art. 
43 also mentions decentralisation as a characteristic of government.5? ????????????
provisions can be found in several organic laws that deal with the decentralisation 
process: the organic law on decentralisation6, the organic law on the regions7 and the 
organic law on the municipalities8. 
??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1595 f.).
3. One of the as yet unrealised aims of the decentralisation process is therefore to reduce such inequalities (Art. 
4 para. c organic law on decentralisation) and to provide the population with better public services (Palacios 
and Roca 2000).
4. All references to Articles are to the Peruvian Constitution unless otherwise indicated.
???????????????????????????? ????????????????
6. Law No. 27783, Ley de Bases de la Descentralización, as amended.
7. Law No. 27867, Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales, as amended.
8. Law No. 27972, Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades, as amended.
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Art. 188 entrenches some general principles from which doctrine derives guidelines 
for the decentralised system (see below). Art. 189 addresses the division of the terri-
tory of the Peruvian republic. Art. 190 lays down norms regarding the process of the 
formation of new regions and Arts. 191 to 193 contain relevant provisions concerning 
the regions, whereas Arts. 194 to 197 entrench similar provisions that refer to the 
municipalities. Art. 198 deals with the status of the capital city of Lima while Art. 199 
determines mechanisms of supervision over the regions and municipalities.
1. Principles of Decentralisation
The principles guiding the decentralisation process stem from the Constitution, but 
are spelt out in the organic law on decentralisation. 
First and foremost, Art. 43 states that the Peruvian state shall be one and indivisible, 
a unitary and decentralised state. Therefore, Art. 43 fosters not only decentralisation 
but also the unitary state, which invites the question of which principle should pre-
vail. The wording of Art. 43 is clear on the fact that Peru should stay a unitary state; 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a unitary state. 
The Peruvian process of decentralisation has to be seen as continuous on-going and 
open-ended (Art. 188, Art. 4 para. a) organic law on decentralisation; Chiclayo Tello 
2007: 75). Nonetheless, this principle could be changed by a constitutional amendment.9 
According to the present Constitution, it is prohibited to step back from the decentrali-
sation process and reverse it (Art. 188, Art.4 para. c) organic law on decentralisation). 
The principle of continuity has to be seen as a result of prior, unsuccessful attempts to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
the decentralisation process has a dynamic design (Art. 188, Art. 4 para. b) organic 
?????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in order to guarantee an adequate allocation of competencies and formation of regions 
(Chiclayo Tello 2007: 78; Elguera Valega 2006: 41).
Dynamism and gradualness are two closely linked principles; some authors argue that 
the process of decentralisation has to be determined by a chronological step-by-step 
plan (Chiclayo Tello 2007: 81; Elguera Valega 2006: 42). This plan is legally stipula-
ted in the II transitory provision of the organic law on decentralisation and is often 
criticised (Azpur 2005: 5 f) due to the fact that one phase of the plan does not have to 
be completed in order to continue with the next step. This approach helps accelerate 
the decentralisation process, but also causes problems, because it is incoherent10.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nucleo duro” of the Constitution, which 
cannot be changed (a concept similar to the German eternity clause). These principles are determined by the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court; however, decentralisation has not yet been mentioned as such an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
similar to the Peruvian ones: the unity of the Spanish nation on the one hand and the guarantee of autonomy 
of nationalities and regions on the other hand (Art. 2 Spanish Constitution; Argullol and Bernadí 2006: 250). 
Other constitutions deal with similar (seemingly opposing) principles, e.g. Art. 1 of the Bolivian Constitution 
guarantees autonomy, but also clearly states that Bolivia is a unitary state, comparable to Art. 1 of the French 
Constitution. Similarly, the Romanian Constitution lays down that Romania is a unitary state (Art. 1 para. 1 
Romanian Constitution) that is administratively organised in counties, towns and municipalities (Art. 3 para. 
3 Romanian Constitution).
10. E.g. the second step of the plan (2nd transitory provision of the organic law on decentralisation) requires 
the elaboration of a plan for regionalisation and certain actions to support the construction of regions. As the 
creation of bigger regions failed (politically), instead of attempting a second time, it was decided to proceed with 
the third step, which consisted in the transfer of certain so-called sectorial competencies. 
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Decentralisation is also regarded as a holistic process (Art. 188, Art. 4 para. e) orga-
nic law on decentralisation). Accordingly, the state as a whole has to take part in this 
process; this involves all levels of government and bodies and institutions of the state. 
Finally, democracy is constitutionally entrenched as a guiding principle for the decen-
tralisation process (Art. 4 para. d) organic law on decentralisation):11 The people, par-
ticularly those who live in the rural regions far from Lima, should have more (direct) 
access to participation procedures (Comité Operativo Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana 
2006: 70 f.).12??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????-
tion process (Chiclayo Tello 2007: 89 f.). 
Apart from these explicit principles laid down in the Constitution, norms on transpa-
rency and good governance were enacted.13 Implicitly, subsidiarity is another relevant 
principle since several provisions in organic and ordinary laws and moreover the 
Constitutional Court refer to the principle — although not the Constitution itself.14
2. Territorial Organisation – Regionalisation without Regions?
Art. 189 contains provisions on the territorial division of the state. Accordingly, the 
territory is divided into regions, departments, provinces and districts. The respective 
departments are placed under the jurisdiction of the regional government, provinces 
and districts under that of the local government. Whereas provinces, districts and 
departments already exist, regions have as yet not been established despite their cons-
titutional entrenchment.15?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is their respective departments. The situation of having regional governments for 
departments is inconsistent, which is due to the planning of the decentralisation pro-
cess. According to the Constitution, the decentralisation process had to be initiated 
by the election of regional governments in the respective departments. The formation 
of regions was planned only afterwards, via referendum; to date no region has been 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????
to realise new, larger regions.16 
3. Lima – Municipality or Region?
Art. 198 relates to the status of the capital. The capital is not part of any of the regions, 
but has a special status which is entrenched in the Constitution. The territorial realm 
of the Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima is understood as coinciding with that of 
the province of Lima, and the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima is empowered to per-
form tasks of regional and local character. According to Art. 33 organic law on decen-
tralisation all the provisions regarding the regions are applicable to the Metropolitan 
11. Another aim is to stabilise and strengthen democracy by fostering involvement of the population (Dargent 
2010: 79). This is also true in regard to federalism and democracy in Latin America in general (Blanco Valdés 
2012: 74.)
12. Other Latin American countries presently also seek to involve their population to a greater extent, cf. Kau-
???????????????????
13. Law no. 27806, Ley de transparencia y acceso a la información pública; cf. Chiclayo Tello 2007: 93. 
14. See below.
15. See Art. 190 PConst and Art. 28 and 29 organic law on decentralisation. A 2005 referendum on the question 
whether new regions should be established was not successful. In 2006, three regional governments decided to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
government did not initiate the required law, the three regions submitted a bill in Congress themselves (law no. 
29768, Ley de Mancomunidad Regional??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
passed that made it attractive for departments to amalgamate into bigger regions.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tivals, public holidays, etc. See below.
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Municipality of Lima as well. Therefore, Lima holds the same competencies as the 
regions and the following thoughts apply equally. 
4. Organisational Structure of the Regions
Art. 191 determines the organisational structure of the regions: a regional council 
(consejo regional????????????? ?????????????????17 functions, whereas the regional 
governor (gobernador regional)18, relying on the administrative authorities of the 
region (in particular the so-called gerencias regionales), has executive functions. He 
is advised by the regional coordination council (consejo de coordinación regional) 
that consists of the mayors of the provincial municipalities and representatives of 
civil society.19 Elections for the regional council and the presidency are to be held 
every four years.20
5. Distribution of Competencies
Art. 192 explicitly enumerates the competencies of the regions. From a regional pers-
pective, the mere fact that the distribution of competencies is laid down in the Consti-
tution is advantageous, since constitutional provisions are less subject to changes than 
organic laws or ordinary acts of parliament. From an overall perspective, however, 
both Art. 192 and the organic laws on decentralisation are less region-friendly. 
The competencies of the regions are laid down in ten paragraphs which include com-
petencies such as the enactment of norms concerning the organisational structure 
and budget of the region (Art. 192 para. 1), the joint elaboration of a regulatory plan 
with municipalities and civil society concerning regional development (Art. 192 para. 
2), the administration of the regions´ properties and their earnings (Art. 192 para. 
3), the regulation and concession of permissions, licences, privileges and rights con-
cerning services of regional responsibilities (Art. 192 para. 4), the promotion of the 
socio-economic development of the region and the execution of the corresponding 
regulatory plans (Art. 192 para. 5) and the promotion of competition, investment and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
required for regional administration (Art. 192 para. 6) and they may table legislative 
initiatives in Congress, insofar as they concern matters of regional competencies. 
Art. 192 para. 10 concludes with a provision that allows regions to exercise any other 
function in accordance with laws. 
One of the most important paragraphs concerning the distribution of competencies 
in the regional context is Art. 192 para. 7, and this is due to its content: it is almost 
the only paragraph that enumerates spheres of competence, such as agriculture or 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
passing of bills or the elaboration of plans. The article states that it is a regional 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in accordance with laws. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18. With the amendment Ley N° 30305, published 10th of March 2015 the term regional president was substituted 
by the term regional governor.
19. Art. 191 PConst is developed mainly through the organic law on the regions. 
20. Art. 11 organic law on the regions.
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Art. 192 para. 7 is noteworthy not only because of its broad content but also because, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Constitution nor the organic laws that develop the relevant provisions on decentra-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it prevents them from enacting laws unless a national law empowers them to do so. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
Firstly, the lack of distinction between legislative and executive competencies is highly 
problematic, and the Constitution does not provide such a distinction, so one could 
assume that either only executive competencies are distributed or that a competence 
matter always encompasses legislative and executive functions. 
For the Constitutional Court, one of the core aspects of the Peruvian decentralised 
system is the political autonomy of the regions that entails normative (legislative)21 
authority; however, the assumption that a competence matter always encompas-
ses legislative and executive functions – as is the case in Spain, where the exclu-
sive powers of the autonomous communities entail legislative and administrative 
functions (Argullol and Bernadí 2006: 248) – cannot be (and actually is not) the 
case in Peru, since the distribution of competencies laid down in the Constitution 
explicitly states that the competence matters listed in Art. 192 para. 7 can only be 
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
regulation of the competence matters to the central legislator (Congress). A glance 
at the respective laws shows that they clearly state which functions are regional 
functions and which functions are the responsibility of the central level, but do not 
distinguish between legislative and executive functions, either. Hence, both levels 
are competent with regard to different functions, which are listed in the organic law 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
developing the distribution of competencies mention different types of competencies, 
the role of the regions (legislative and/or executive) in each type of competence has 
to be examined through an analysis of its functions. 
Secondly, the Constitution neither distinguishes between exclusive and shared res-
pectively concurrent competencies nor explains how to interpret the non-exclusive 
competencies. This is especially relevant for the competence matters laid down in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????-
re cannot be exclusive competencies. The distinction between exclusive and shared 
competencies is laid down in the respective organic laws, based on Art. 192; those 
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
petencies” (Art. 9 organic law on the regions) and part of them (excluding those with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Art. 35 organic law on decentralisation). According to Art. 10 para. 2 organic law on 
decentralisation the exclusive competencies of the regions cannot be restricted by 
either the (central) legislative power or the (central) executive power.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????competencias compartidas”, 
21. See below.
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Art. 10 para. 2 organic law on the regions, Art. 36 organic law on decentralisation). 
Still, there remain doubts on how to interpret the so-called competencias comparti-
das, especially if they have to be seen as either concurrent or shared competencies. 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
gions for each of the competencies laid down in Art. 192 para. 7, but often rema-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
subject matter. Thus, the competencias compartidas do not constitute concurrent, 
but shared competencies. 
There remains the question of if, and to what extent regions are empowered to exercise 
legislative functions in regard to shared competencies. The respective provisions in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
law on the regions). In the absence of a clear legal provision on how to understand 
shared competencies, especially with regard to possible legislative and/or executive 
functions, other concepts for determining those functions have to be applied. As the 
Constitution and the organic law on the regions both are silent on the question of (com-
petence) interpretation, the case law of the Constitutional Court is of high importance. 
In the past, the Court developed the competence test and applied the loyalty principle 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
systems22) and the so-called principle of competence.
Finally, Art. 192 is – as already mentioned – further developed by two organic laws:23 
the organic law on decentralisation and the organic law on the regions. Art. 106 states 
that only certain matters, like matters regarding the organisation of the state, are 
subject to organic laws. Whereas the Constitution can only be amended in the rather 
complicated procedure laid down in Art. 20624, organic laws are subject to the same 
procedural rules that apply to ordinary laws25. From a regional point of view, this has 
positive and negative aspects; both sets of rules (constitutional provisions and organic 
law provisions) are passed by the central level. From the regional perspective if norms 
are region-friendly, it is preferable that they are laid down in the Constitution; if they 
are not, it is probably more advantageous if they are laid down in organic laws, as 
changes are easier to realise and therefore more probable. However there is the risk 
of a worsening of the situation of the regions as well. 
22. For Austria cf. Gamper 2010: 95.
23. This seems to be similar to the case of Belgium: According to Art. 39 of the Belgian Constitution, it is up to 
special majority laws to develop the competencies of the regions (Dumont et al 2006: 41).
24. Constitutional amendments are passed by a majority of 2/3 in Congress in two consecutive annual sessions 
or by means of an absolute majority in Congress followed by a referendum (Art. 206 PConst and Art. 81 para. a 
parliamentary rules of procedure). 
25. Art. 81 para. b parliamentary rules of procedure.
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6. Residuary Clause 
While the Peruvian Constitution does not explicitly regulate for residual competencies, 
the Constitutional Court makes deductions based on Art. 4 organic law on the execu-
tive branch, which provides that all competencies, functions and attributions which 
are not attributed to the regional or local level are to be considered as belonging to 
the competence sphere of the executive branch. The Constitutional Court takes from 
this provision that the competencies of the subnational governments are exhaustively 
listed (case no. 0020-2005-PI/TC, recital 49). Moreover the Court holds that the re-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
federation (case no. 0020-2005-PI/TC, recital 46). Therefore, according to the Court, 
Peru does not rank among federal states, as the residuary clause is not favourable to 
the regions. This seems highly problematic for several reasons.
Firstly, the allocation of residuary powers at constituent state level is only true for 
the majority of federations (and also for the established South American federations, 
??????? ?????????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????-
titute an indispensable characteristic of a federal system (Watts 2008: 89). Without 
doubt states such as India and Canada are federal systems – although the residual 
authority is retained by the federal government (Watts 2008: 89). 
Secondly, a residuary clause in favour of the central level would have to be stated in 
the Constitution or in an organic law concerning decentralisation. As will be shown, 
the Constitutional Court assumes that regions are vested with legislative authority. 
Therefore, a residuary clause that should not only entail executive but also legislati-
ve functions cannot be laid down in the organic law on the executive branch as the 
organic law on the executive itself states that it applies only to the executive branch 
(and therefore not to the legislative branch). However, a residuary clause would have 
to be valid for the executive and the legislative branch.
Thirdly (and closely linked to the aforementioned problem), the wording should be 
????????????????????corresponde al gobierno nacional??????corresponde al Estado” 
????????????corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo”, since – if we follow the case law of the 
Constitutional Court as well as doctrine – not only executive but also legislative com-
petencies are transferred to the local and regional level. 
7. Legislative Authority and Constitution-Making Powers
It is highly questionable whether regions are vested with legislative authority or 
???????????????ordenanzas??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ding to Art. 192 preamble, all competencies always have to be exercised in harmony 
with national plans and policies. This phrase restricts the regions’ margins of action. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This gives the impression that regional norms are not laws but rather administrative 
regulations.26 Nonetheless, the conclusion cannot be drawn that the use of the term 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????décrets???????ordonnances” issued by the parliaments of the 
Communities and the Regions of Belgium which – despite their names – are consi-
dered laws (De Becker 2011: 255; Gamper 2004: 208 f.). 
26. It has to be noted that in other recently regionalised or federalised systems, terms like the one mentioned 
above are also rather avoided, for Italy, e.g., cf. Gamper (2004: 266).
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????norma??????normar” 
?????ordenanza regional” when dealing with regional norms that are issued by the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it in a number of cases on decentralisation. In a case from 200427, the Peruvian Cons-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
competencies implied a restriction of the legislative power at the central level.28 In 
perhaps the most famous case on decentralisation issues, the so-called hoja de coca 
decision29 of 2005, the Court quoted Fernando Badia30, according to whom autonomy 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
At the same time, it stressed the importance of the principle of loyalty; regions were 
not allowed to legislate31 if it was against national interests. 
Probably the strongest argument in favour of legislative authority of the Peruvian 
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32
Hence, the Peruvian Constitutional Court deduces regional legislative functions from 
constitutional provisions (Art. 200 para. 4 and Art. 191) and the concept of autonomy. 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court does not say so openly. 
It is already problematic that the constitutional and legal provisions are not clear on 
the question of whether regional legislative authority shall be conferred or not; howe-
ver, the case law of the Constitutional Court warrants further critical examination. 
Since it can only be assumed that the Court approves the concept of regional legislative 
authority (and not the opposite), it is unclear why the Court does not openly say so. 
On account of such vague legal provisions, a clearer case law of the Court would be of 
great importance and could have a positive impact on the entire process of decentra-
lisation as it could balance the vague legal provisions and serve as a stabilising factor. 
The deduction of legislative authority from the concept of autonomy is not unheard 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
autonomy implies (amongst other functions) the possibility to exercise legislative 
functions. Art. 272 of the Bolivian Constitution could therefore serve as a prototype 
for a possible future Peruvian constitutional provision. 
Given that the regions possess legislative authority, the next question – whether the 
regions have constitution-making powers – arises. According to Art. 192 para. 1, 
regions are empowered to regulate their own organisation. For this purpose, each 
region has a statute, the so-called ROF (reglamento de organización y funciones33), 
enacted by regional ordinance, but without any particular formal requirement which 
27. Case no. 00047-2004-AI/TC, recital 119.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
subject matter, but rather has to follow the distribution of competencies as it is laid down in the Constitution 
and the laws. Therefore, the distribution of competence is a material and competential limit to the exercise of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????case no. 00047-2004-AI/TC, recital 119.
29. This case dealt with three regional ordinances, all of which declared the coca leaf to be a part of the cultural 
heritage of the nation and legalised its cultivation, which violated national norms. 
30. Case no. 0020-2005-AI/TC, 0021-2005-AI/TC, recital 40.
???????????????????????????dictar normas”.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the status of laws: laws, legislative decrees, decrees of urgency, treaties, standing rules of Congress, regional 
norms of general character and municipal ordinances that contradict the Constitution formally or materially.” 
33. Statute on organisation and functions.
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could justify the assumption that the ROF would be equivalent to a regional consti-
tution. Here, the Bolivian Constitution could once again serve as a prototype: Art. 
275 declares the statute of each subnational level (Estatuto or Carta Orgánica) to be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
territorial entity”. In the case of Peru, neither the Constitution nor other laws allow 
the conclusion that regions are vested with constitution-making power. Still, some 
regional ordinances possess a partly constitutional character that refers to constituent 
statehood, which is indicated by regional symbols or hymns, for example.34 To date, 
nobody has claimed that those ordinances could be unconstitutional and the Consti-
tutional Court therefore has not had the possibility to scrutinise these ordinances.35 
8. Interpretation of Competencies
In the context of the distribution of competencies, problems arise from missing rules 
(and an absence of clear rulings) on methods of interpretation of competencies36 and 
other rules to solve misunderstandings created by the distribution of competencies 
- an example is the loyalty principle which the Constitutional Court developed in its 
case law37. 
The competent umpire to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution is the Pe-
ruvian Constitutional Court. The prototype of a Constitutional Court was set up in 
Peru in 1979. Since 1993 there has been a proper Constitutional Court; however this 
Court – instituted by Art. 201 still faces some institutional problems (e.g. in regard 
to the proportionality test Rubio Correa 2011: 127).
Similar to other Latin American countries, constitutional review is constructed as a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????
can be declared unconstitutional and repealed erga omnes by the Constitutional 
Court on the one hand, but can also be declared inapplicable by a judge of an ordi-
nary court (inter partes effect) in a concrete case on the other hand. According to 
Art. 202 para. 3, the Constitutional Court is competent to decide (amongst others) 
on conflicts of competence and, under Art. 200 para. 4, to decide on the constitu-
tionality of regional ordinances. 
In the context of decentralisation, two concepts developed by the Constitutional Court 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????bloque de constitucionalidad” (block 
of constitutionality).38 In the event that the constitutionality of a norm is doubtful, the 
Constitutional Court not only examines the relevant constitutional provisions but also 
organic and ordinary laws in order to determine whether the norm is unconstitutional. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Puno region.
35. See e.g. Art. 8 ROF Ayacucho, ordinance no. 004-07-GRA/CR, which underlines inter alia the importance 
of cultural identity in the improvement of the situation of the regional population. 
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
on constitutional interpretation. The Codigo Procesal Constitucional statutes in Art. V that constitutionally 
guaranteed rights have to be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
human rights treaties and decisions on human rights applying to treaties of which Peru is a part, decided by 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
37. See e.g. case no. 00024-2007-PI/TC; nonetheless the Court does not always apply the loyalty principle in the 
same way (e.g. case no. 0020-2005-PI/TC, recital 42–45 and case no. 00011-2008-PI/TC, recital 27).
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
laws pertaining to delimitation of powers lack constitutional status, but they are a necessary complement to 
the Constitution. For this reason, they along with the Constitution, are considered to form part of the so-called 
‘block of constitutionality’ – the complex set of regulations that the Constitutional Court must consider in or-
der to determine the validity or invalidity of state and/or Autonomous Community regulations.” (Argullol and 
Bernadí 2006: 244).
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However, the block of constitutionality is not a static concept; depending on the res-
pective case, the norms that form it may vary. Furthermore, it is not only important 
with regard to the topic of decentralisation but also in considering other cases. For 
instance, if it is doubtful whether a regional ordinance or an ordinary national law 
based on a shared competence laid down in Art. 192 para. 7 is in line with the Cons-
titution, the organic law on the regions and the organic law on decentralisation have 
to be taken into account for its interpretation. But, as the Constitutional Court holds, 
in some cases it might be necessary to consider other provisions as well. Therefore, 
in order to know if a regional ordinance is in line with the constitutionally laid-down 
allocation of competencies, a considerable number of legal provisions have to be taken 
into account.39 
??????????????????????????????????test de competencia” (competence test)40, which was 
indeed introduced for issues arising mainly out of the decentralisation process. This 
test consists of several principles that help determine whether or not a norm exceeds 
the competence on which it is based, as outlined below.
9. A More Detailed Look at the Competence Test
To determine which body is vested with the power to exercise a certain competence, 
??????????????????????????????????????test de competencia” (competence test) which 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????41. This prin-
ciple states that regional ordinances are not inferior to ordinary laws of the central 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
shall be solved by examining whether the region is competent to issue that norm.42 
The competence test consists of several principles, such as the principle of unity 
(consisting of the sub-principles of cooperation and solidarity, of enumeration and 
residuality, and the principle of control) and is of importance especially when shared 
competencies come into play. After testing the principle of unity, the principle of 
competence (consisting of the principle of competence in the narrow sense and the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
?????????????????????????43 of implicit powers and the principle of progressive transfer 
of competencies also come into play. The Constitutional Court deduces (and further 
develops) these principles from constitutional provisions, especially Art. 188.
In a next step, the Constitutional Court applies the competence test as explained abo-
ve. It is often confusing, since the competence test and its principles are applied by the 
Court only in abstracto. The deliberative steps taken by the Court are not elaborated 
upon; the Court mentions the steps of the competence test but does not match them 
with the concrete facts. Hence, although these principles play a certain role in the 
consideration of the Constitutional Court, their relevance and the exact extent to which 
they are taken into consideration are left open. This raises another problem in that it 
39. Case no. 0001-2012-PI/TC???????????????
40. See e.g. case no. 0013-2003-CC/TC.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
principle means that regional ordinances are inferior to ordinary laws of congress. The Court stated several 
times that in the context of decentralisation the competence principle (and not the hierarchy principle) had to 
be applied (case no. 00005-2012-PI/TC, A/. recital 10).
42. The opposing principle would be the principle of hierarchy. According to this principle, a national law always 
prevails over a regional ordinance. 
43. It seems strange that the principle of subsidiarity, although mentioned as a principle guiding the distribution 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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is not clear how to proceed in the event that the application of two principles leads to 
?????????????????? ??????????????????? ???? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????
Although the competence test and its principles must be understood as guiding criteria 
to determine whether the competence is in line with constitutional requirements or 
not, it cannot be seen as proper method of interpretation (generally Gamper 2012: 110 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
provisions, it can be assumed that the conclusion Rubio Correa (2011: 107) draws with 
regard to the proportionality test is also true for the competence test; as long as the 
Peruvian Constitution (and its system of constitutional control) is still not consolida-
ted, the Constitutional Court should help create clarity and legal certainty through 
the improvement of the application of this test by a stable case law.
10. Excursus no 1: Distribution of Competencies in the Mining Sector – 
an Example
The complexity of the distribution of competencies can be illustrated through an 
examination of the situation of the mining sector. The most important cases brought 
before the Constitutional Court in recent years concern the regional ordinances which 
prohibit mining – not directly, but in roundabout ways. In the case of a regional or-
dinance prohibiting a mining project44, the Constitutional Court had to determine 
whether mining was an exclusive or concurrent competence of the regions. For this 
purpose, it used the test de competencia and the bloque de constitucionalidad.45
Mining is one of the subject matters mentioned in Art. 192 para. 7, but the Article only 
provides that mining falls within the competence of the regions according to the law. 
??????????????????????according to the law ????????????????????????????????????????
that Art. 192 para. 746 has to be understood as a shared competence, partly executed 
by the regions and partly by the central government. As laid down above, the law in 
this case refers to the organic laws that implement the Constitution, but, depending 
on the case, it could also imply ordinary acts of parliament. 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
states that regions must always take into account national plans when exercising 
their functions. The latter clause is nothing but a manifestation of the loyalty princi-
ple, binding in this case the regional government to respect the national plans. Art. 
59 of the organic law on the regions contains the respective provisions on mining; 
according to its para. c, regions are empowered to foster and monitor activities of 
??????? ????????????????????? ???????pequeña minería and minería artesanal), and 
44. Cf. case no. 0001-2012-PI/TC, the so-called Conga Case, named after the mining project (regional ordinance 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
project illegal), case no. 00009-2010-PI/TC, the so-called Cusco Case, named after the region of Cusco, which 
issued the ordinance in question (regional ordinance declaring the whole region as an area free of large scale 
mining) and case no. 008-2010-PI/TC (municipal ordinance prohibiting the issuing of licenses for mining). The 
last case (no. 00005-2012-PI/TC) is peculiar, because the regional ordinance in question was not equivalent to 
a prohibition of mining, but rather tied companies to national laws aimed at protecting the environment which 
stipulated that private investments were in the regions’ interest and necessary for them, establishing certain 
obligations for these activities in the region. The Constitutional Court again applied both the competence test 
and the bloque de constitucionalidad??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
ordinance in its actual version unconstitutional (case no. 00005-2012-PI/TC, § 2 A/.).
45. Case no. 0001-2012-PI/TC, § 5, case no. 00009-2010-PI/TC, recital 10.
???? ????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????according to the laws??
are shared competencies. 
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furthermore support activities of exploration and the exploitation of mining resources 
of the region according to law.
As a consequence, by reviewing all laws that somehow regulate the competence mat-
ter of mining, it is possible to establish which functions the region is empowered to 
exercise in this competence. Moreover, Art. 59 para. f. organic law on the regions 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ??????
in the region. To illustrate the interpretation of these laws the ‘Conga’ and ‘Cusco’ 
cases are cited below.
In the ‘Conga’ case the mining project was not a project of small mining or artisanal 
mining which would have fallen under the competence of the regional government in 
accordance with Art. 59 para. 7. Although the central level was in favour of the project, 
in order to protect its population, the region tried to prohibit the project indirectly by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The regional ordinance in question in the ‘Cusco’ case prohibited the issuing of mi-
ning licenses in the whole region of Cusco. As large scale mining (gran minería) is 
not listed as a competence of the regions, it is to be construed as a competence of the 
central level. Therefore, the regional ordinance which declared the project infeasible 
in the Conga case was unconstitutional. In the Cusco case, the Court, similarly to the 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
region was not competent to declare that no mining licenses could be issued, since it 
indirectly interfered with a national competence. 
The examples show the weak position of the regions, as not only mining, but all the 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
As a consequence, regions are limited in exercising their functions; as more national 
plans are elaborated, and the more detailed they become, the less leeway regions 
possess. Moreover, national plans do not have to be organic laws, but can also be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
11. Excursus no 2: Regional Identity
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and symbols, typical food, etc., are becoming increasingly common. For example, 
Art. 6 para. a) of the organisational statute of the region of Apurímac states that one 
fundamental aim of the region is the construction of a united community with its own 
????????????????????Son objetivos fundamentales del Gobierno Regional, los siguientes: 
a) Construir una comunidad integrada, unida y con identidad cultural,????????
Whereas regional ordinances dealing with economically relevant subject matters are 
often brought before the Constitutional Court, ordinances regarding cultural issues 
without any economic background have not been challenged. However, it may well 
be the case that some of these regional norms might not always be in line with the 
Constitution, as the following example of a regional ordinance issued by the region 
of Cusco illustrates.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the respective laws further developing it47, the region of Cusco introduced, in Art. 4 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
47. The region is referring to Art. 2 para. 19 PConst which recognises the personal right of ethnic and cultural 
identity and Art. 48 which states that Spanish and – in regions with a predominantly indigenous population – 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with regard to the relevant constitutional norms, it seems questionable whether the 
competence on which the region bases Art. 4 of the ordinance covers the requirement 
of additional skills for public employees in the region of Cusco, since Art. 2 para. 2 
prohibits discrimination inter alia based on language and Art. 2 para. 19 2nd sentence 
guarantees every national the right to interact with authorities in his or her language 
via an interpreter. The competence of education and its functions (deriving mainly 
from Art. 9 and 10 law on the regions) empowers regions to introduce norms on bi-
lingual and intercultural education so as to foster the use of original languages in the 
region, but does probably not provide a basis for the requirement of a basic knowledge 
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The Constitution is silent on the question of regional identity. Questions concerning 
cultural issues are partly covered by provisions on education and are partly a local 
competence according to Art. 195 numeral 8. It remains to be seen how the stren-
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
whether there will be any reaction of the central government in regard to the growing 
amount of regional ordinances concerning cultural issues.
12. The Role of the Subsidiarity Principle
Although the principle of subsidiarity is of considerable importance the principle 
itself is ambiguous – it is explicitly prescribed in laws concerning decentralisation 
in Peru (Art. 4 para. f. and Art. 14 organic law on decentralisation), various regional 
norms refer to it and – moreover, some regional organisation statutes (ROF) contain 
a clause on subsidiarity.48????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
salience in periods of institutional transformation” (Follesdal 1998: 191), is not clear at 
all, though. Therefore, some important issues of this principle in the present context 
require examination.
One problem is whether the subsidiarity principle can justify legislation of regional 
governments in matters laid down as shared competencies or if it can only be unders-
tood as guidelines for the legislator while elaborating the distribution of competen-
cies. In the preamble of its ordinance regarding the ‘Conga’ case above, the region of 
Cajamarca pointed out that as a result of the application of the subsidiarity principle, 
the level of government that is the most suited49 to perform a competence should be 
the one empowered to actually exercise the competence. In this case the region in-
voked the subsidiarity principle to pass an ordinance based on a function of a shared 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
As discussed above, according to the Constitution (and the respective provisions) and 
?????????????????????????????????????competencias compartidas” have to be unders-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both levels to perform the same action in the same subject matter. Therefore, in the 
case of shared competencies the subsidiarity principle can only be understood as 
guiding the legislator while elaborating the distribution of competencies. and hence 
the subsidiarity principle cannot justify legislation of regional governments e.g. in the 
48. So the ROF of Apurímac (Art. 9 para. j), Ancash (Art. 8) or the ROF of Cusco (Art. 10 para. 10).
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
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???????? ??????????????????????????? ?????50, as the functions are already clearly laid 
down in the relevant provisions.51 
As many (and probably the most important) subject matters are equally laid down in 
Art. 192 subpara 7 the conclusions of the above mentioned case also apply to those 
competence areas. This leads to the question of the extent to which the subsidiarity 
principle is relevant, if at all. An examination of case law leads to the conclusion that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
application of the subsidiarity principle.
In the ‘Mufarech’ case52, the Constitutional Court linked the subsidiarity principle to 
the principle of proportionality.53 According to the Court, the role of the principle of 
proportionality is to limit the application of the subsidiarity principle – or, in other 
words, to determine whether the allocation of a competence to the lower level of go-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
line with the aims of the Constitution; second, the allocation envisaged has to be the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
the interest of any other level of government or restrict the capacity to act of any other 
level of government. To invoke the proportionality principle might help determine the 
??????????????????????????????????????????
The Court seems to use the term in a way which would suggest that the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity always requires the allocation of a power at the lowest 
level of government. Subsidiarity, however, does not necessarily imply this. Rather, 
it implies that if the lower level is capable of exercising a certain competence more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The principle of subsidiarity always has to be applied when competencies are allocated. 
Once competencies and functions are distributed it does not make sense to invoke the 
subsidiarity principle. 
The subsidiarity principle thus does not play a big role in the Peruvian decentralisation 
process. Nonetheless, the consideration of the principle in the process of allocating 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ciency of the decentralisation process. Nonetheless the application of the subsidiarity 
principle is no panacea; as the experiences of other federal states and the EU have 
???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????minería artesanal??????????????? ?????????????????????????-
tent to legislate.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
view (see case no. 0002-2005-AI/TC???????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
such a distribution”). Nonetheless, the region could have taken action against (national) laws distributing the 
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on decentralisation, Art. 4 f. organic law on the regions) and therefore the Constitution by non-consideration 
of the subsidiarity principle.
52. See case no. 0002-2005-AI/TC?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the principle of proportionality and necessity, which mean that the action of the state must not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the aims of the Constitution. That means a materia can only be assigned to the government 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
threefold way of such a distribution – the proposed distribution needs to be in line with the aims of the Consti-
??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
and adequate possible, which means that the most ‘benign’ means have to be chosen – the determination of 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to the Lisbon Treaty of the 
????????????????????????????????th March 2010) also shows the close relation between these concepts. On the 
development of the jurisprudence on the subsidiarity principle and its application in Peru cf. Rubio Correa (2011).
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shown, the translation of the subsidiarity principle into a justiciable rule of law is not 
easy at all (for Germany Taylor 2009). 
III. THE SECOND CHAMBER, OR OTHER MECHANISMS  
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF  
THE CENTRAL LEVEL
A bicameral system where regions are represented in the second chamber allows 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
However, this depends on factors such as the selection (or election) of the members (or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Fujimori, the former bicameral system in Peru was changed into a unicameral system 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
establishment of a second chamber have been introduced in Congress since then – so 
far without any success.54 Still, there remain some possibilities for regions to directly 
participate at the central level; in several subject matters, regions are authorised to 
propose bills directly in Congress.55 
IV. FISCAL POWERS
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
laws”). Art. 192 numeral 3, in connection with Art. 193 numeral 3, is the only reference 
to regional taxes: the former empowers regions to administrate their properties and 
earnings, and the latter lists taxes created through (national) laws in favour of the 
regions, as regional income. This means that, without a national law, regions are not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
so via (ordinary or organic) law. Therefore, as long as there is no such law the regions 
depend on transfers by the central government and certain quotas on royalties56. 
Furthermore, Art. 7457 must be taken into consideration as it authorises regions 
and municipalities to create, alter and cancel charges and fees in their respective 
jurisdiction and within the limits provided by law. This wording58 raises the ques-
tion whether regions and municipalities are allowed to decide on their contributions 
and fees as long as there is no (central) law, as long as their norms do not exceed a 
(central) law or if a (central) law is prerequisite for regional and local norms (Ruiz 
de Castillo Ponce de León). The wording of Art. 74 would seem to support the view 
54. The latest bill (Bill no. 3183/2018-PE from August 2018) dates from August 2018. Yet, in this proposal the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
where regions would not be represented. So even if the latest proposal is realised, Peruvian regions will not count 
on representation, but the situation could be compared to that of Spain, where the senate is not construed as a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ber will be part of the referendum on several amendments of the Constitution, scheduled for December 2018 
(see https://gestion.pe/peru/politica/referendum-2018-4-preguntas-fecha-votar-miembros-mesa-multa-nnda-
nnlt-247945???????????????? ??????????????????
55. From 2011 to date, regions have proposed 24 bills, see http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/
CLProLey2011.nsf???????????????? ?????????????????
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????? ?????????
regions with few resources are deprived of this source of income.
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
58. The problem lies with the question of whether „conforme ley????????????????????????????????????????????????-
valent to „con los límites que señala la ley???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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that regions and municipalities can determine their contributions and fees without 
a national law empowering them to do so, but respecting national laws that could 
eventually set certain limits which could be extensive. However, this view is not 
shared by doctrine and the Constitutional Court; accordingly, they share the opinion 
that regions cannot directly determine the amount of fees and contributions (case 
no. 0012-2003-AI/TC).59 
V. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
The importance of coordination in the horizontal as well as the vertical sense has 
been steadily increasing, not least due to case law of the Constitutional Court. The 
Court has held that not only the regions but also the central level of government 
have to consider the principles of cooperation and solidarity when exercising their 
respective competencies (case no. 00011-2008-PI/TC). The most important insti-
tution for cooperation is the National Council on Coordination. This council unites 
representatives of the central, regional and local level and is expected to represent 
regional and local interests at the central level, however the regions in particular 
criticise its limited sphere of influence, since it can only give recommendations and 
not enact binding decisions. Therefore, regions and local governments have created 
their own institutions and are now represented in associations that operate jointly at 
the central level. The association of regions in particular seems to work successfully 
via informal meetings with representatives of the central level, by coordinating e.g. 
proposals for bills in Congress and by joint statements on day events.60 Although the 
very existence of the National Council on Coordination as a (formal) institution of 
cooperation –– is a positive it would be advantageous if it had more weight. It could 
further the decentralisation process and better serve as a platform of communication 
for the different levels.61 When compared to federal states the status quo in Peru is 
not surprising; very often actions of cooperation and coordination are exercised by 
informal means (Watts 2008, 118). 
VI. SOUTH AMERICAN FEDERALISM?
Federal systems can be found all over the world and in states with very different 
socio-political circumstances, histories and needs (Blanco Valdés 2012: 11 ff). This 
raises the question of whether we require different parameters from the (North-) 
American and European standard to determine if states on the South American con-
tinent are federal or not. The literature does not support this assumption (Armenta 
López 2010: 83 ff; Fernández Segado 2003: 4; Blanco Valdés 2012). For example, 
Watts (2008) considered Latin American states like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela in his comparative research, while Kincaid and Tarr (eds. 2005) included 
chapters on Brazil and Mexico and Saxena (2011) included states like Brazil, Canada, 
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????-
co Valdés (2012: 15) distinguishes between the classic federations (United States, 
Switzerland, Australia and Canada), the Ibero-American federations which are to 
be classified as federal systems (Argentina, Mexico and Brazil) and, lastly, what he 
59. Fees and contributions are charged for the delivery of a certain service, e.g. waste collection. Taxes, on the 
contrary, are paid without receiving a direct service.
60. Cf. the homepage of the association www.angr.org.pe???????????????? ??????????????????
61. Currently, a process of restructuring of the National Council on Coordination is taking place. In March 2013, 
a Commission with the objective of creating a proposal on a new decree on the National Council on Coordination 
was created. In April 2014, the President of the Council of Ministers announced the restructuring of the National 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Belgium and Spain), and conducts a comparative analysis of their (federal) structure.
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or ‘pure’ form of federation” (ibid). Nonetheless, Latin American states do have their 
common grounds; e.g. in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico the idea of federalism has a 
rather long tradition62 and their Constitutions were (at least in regard to the federal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????63
VII. A FEDERAL DESIGN FOR THE PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION – 
STILL A LONG WAY TO GO?
First, the fact that the distribution of competencies is laid down in the Constitution 
has to be seen as positive from a regional point of view. In addition, the regions are 
not only referred to in abstracto, but each region is explicitly mentioned in the Cons-
titution; the abolition of a single region would need a constitutional amendment, 
which grants a certain stability.
Second, the primary problems of the norms on decentralisation of the Peruvian 
Constitution, and more specifically of the distribution of competencies, arise from 
the missing distinction between legislative and executive competencies and the use 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
different contexts and it is difficult to arrive at a clear definition. The most recent 
demonstration of this ambiguity is a bill proposed in August 201364, which was lod-
ged by a member of Congress in order to empower the Presidency of the Ministers 
Council to determine the scope of transferred competencies (shared competencies). 
Irrespective of the question of whether the Presidency of the Ministers Council was 
indeed competent, it shows that Peruvian politicians have become aware of the de-
ficiencies of the decentralisation process.
Third, to prevent conflicts like those presented in the cases concerning mining, it 
could be beneficial to entrench a constitutional distinction between legislative and 
executive competencies. It could, for instance, be helpful to provide that in matters 
of shared competence, the central government is competent to legislate and the re-
gional governments are competent to execute those laws or to enact their own laws 
(ordinances) in the framework of central laws. Since the functions laid down in the 
organic laws on the regions are not explicit on the question of whether they allocate 
executive or legislative competencies of the respective government, such clarification 
would help prevent competence conflicts.
Fourth, the question whether regional ordinances are laws or just bylaws remains 
unanswered. The wording of the Constitution and the organic laws that develop the 
relevant constitutional provision are not clear on that question. On the one hand, 
62. Argentina and Brazil were initially unitary states but changed into federal systems more than a century ago 
(Hernandez 2006: 8 f.; Souza 2005: 79), Mexico became a federal state after gaining independence with a short 
interruption in the 19th century (Gutiérrez González 2005: 210).
63. Moreover, recent decentralisation processes take the Spanish and Italian developments as model, not least 
for practical linguistic reasons (Carrión M. 2002: 120 f.). The reception of ideas from foreign countries also often 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
64. Proyecto de Ley N 2538/2013-CR, Proyecto de Ley que incorpora la cuarta disposición complementaria a 
la ley de bases de la descentralización.
PORTADA 
SUMARIO
 
PRESENTACIÓN 
ÁREAS DE ESTUDIO 
NOVEDADES DEL 
FEDERALISMO COMPARADO
NOVEDADES DEL  
ESTADO AUTONÓMICO
NOVEDADES 
PARLAMENTARIAS
ACTUALIDAD 
IBEROAMÉRICANA
CRÓNICA  
INTERNACIONAL
CALIDAD DEMOCRÁTICA
AGENDA 
ACTIVIDADES REALIZADAS  
JUNIO A NOVIEMBRE 2018
ACTIVIDADES PREVISTAS  
DICIEMBRE 2018 A JUNIO 2019
CRÉDITOS
INSTRUCCIONES PARA  
LOS AUTORES 
LISTA DE EVALUADORES
Cuadernos Manuel Giménez AbadNº 16 - DICIEMBRE 2018
25 / 187
doctrine and the constitutional court seem to assume that regional ordinances are 
laws or at least are treated like laws. On the other hand, part of doctrine (Apac 2005) 
draws the conclusion that ordinances are just secondary legislation. Supporters of 
the latter opinion particularly argue that any regional norm has to be in line with 
national laws and plans. It would be highly advisable to clarify this via a constitu-
tional amendment or an organic law.
Fifth, the methods used by the Constitutional Court are often opaque. The best exam-
ple in this context is probably the test of competence, as it remains unclear how it 
shall be applied in concreto. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the Constitutional Court is still a comparatively recent 
addition to the institutional landscape of Peru. Rules of constitutional interpretation 
are not laid down in the Constitution and have, as yet, not been developed by the Cons-
titutional Court in a predictable manner. Written rules of constitutional interpretation 
could therefore help balance some of the problems the Peruvian Constitutional Court 
is still facing (generally Gamper 2012: 310 f.) and could further democratic legitimacy, 
and increase the predictability of and standardise the interpretation of legal norms 
(Gamper 2012: 89). At the very least, they could pave the path to a consistent65 – albeit 
possibly still centralistic – case law on the subject of decentralisation.66
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
states, the answer can only be in the negative. Despite recent (positive) developments 
showing that Peruvian politicians are aware of the variety of problems (distribution 
of competencies, the absence of a second chamber/mechanism to participate in the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but still unitary state. 
Compared to the South American trend, this is no surprise. Whereas the established 
federal systems on the continent, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are not 
expected to undergo significant changes towards unitary systems, decentralisation is 
an important issue for most of the unitary states. Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution and the 
new Ecuadorian Constitution both install a decentralisation scheme that, at least in 
the Bolivian case, should not be underestimated. For example, Bolivia’s subnational 
entities are even (at least partly) vested with legislative authority (Art. 272 Bolivian 
Constitution), and are empowered to pass their own statutes with increased formal 
requirements (2/3rd majority). Similarly, Chile and Colombia have experienced at 
least small steps towards decentralisation; in Chile, a law on regional governance 
and administration was implemented in 1993 (Ley orgánica constitucional sobre 
gobierno y administración regional67; Arenas 2009: 34) and in Colombia, the 1991 
Constitution introduced a concept of autonomy for certain territorial divisions (Art. 
1 Colombian Constitution; Ordonez Santo 2012).
To conclude, it can be asserted that decentralisation is a general trend on the conti-
nent, primarily in the context of democratisation and the distribution of economic 
resources (González 2008: 212, 213). Very often, these processes are not only in-
fluenced by developments in neighbouring states but also by European developments 
and the case law of European Constitutional Courts on the topic of federalism and 
65. Due to the vagueness of the distribution of competencies on the one hand and the rule that the national level 
is (exclusively) competent to elaborate general policies of the state on the other hand, the Constitutional Court 
seldom decides in favour of the regions. 
66. However, Peru is not the only state facing the problem of an imbalanced case law. For Brazil cf. Arretche 
2012: 142. 
67. Law no. 19175, reproclaimed 8.8.2005.
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regionalism. For example, the Peruvian constitutional court referred to Spanish and 
Italian literature on decentralisation (e.g. in case no. 0002-2005-AI, 00031-2005-AI, 
00010-2008-AI and 00011-2008-AI) and to the Spanish, Italian and German situa-
tion concerning federalism and regionalism in general (e.g. in case no. 0002-2005-
AI and 0020-2005, 0021-2005-AI) numerous times. Hence, trends of Spanish and 
Italian regionalism in particular might also influence the Peruvian decentralisation 
process. A federal design for the Peruvian Constitution thus remains unfinished 
business – at present.
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